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NOTES
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-MEASURE OF DAMAGES
I. THE DocTmVnE nT GENERL
The general nature and application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel' has been thoroughly discussed in the past by very able
commentators.2 It is not the purpose of this note to enlarge upon
these analyses. However, as a basis for a summary of the present
status of the doctrine, perhaps a brief review is in order.
No proposition of law is more familiar to the legal profession in
general than the rule that consideration consists of any legal detriment incurred by the promisee, which was "bargained for and given
in exchange for the promise.' 3 There are numerous situations in
which there is a promise, upon which the promisee has relied to his
detriment, which is nevertheless unenforceable under the orthodox
view of consideration because the reliance was not the agreed equivalent of the promise. The substantial injustice inherent in such cases
is the reason for the development of the rule 4 that reliance on such a
promise, under the proper circumstances, will make it enforceable.5
1. The term "promissory estoppel" is used here only because it is so used
by a majority of the courts which recognize the doctrine. RESTATEPENT,
CONTRACT § 90 (1932) is adopted as an explanation of the term, although it is
to be noted that "promissory estoppel" is not mentioned:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part
of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
Williston advocates the term "promissory estoppel" to distinguish the doctrine
from equitable estoppel, 1 WLLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 140 (3d ed. 1957), whereas
Corbin describes the phrase as "objectionable" because of the elusiveness of
the term "estoppel" and commends the American Law Institute for "stating
its rule in terms of action or forbearance in reliance on the promise." 1
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 204 (1950).
2. See, e.g., 1 CORBn, CONTRACTS §§ 193-209 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 140 (3d ed. 1957); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (1950); Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
4. The situation in which there is no bargain or exchange and hence no
consideration is merely an example. The doctrine is applicable in any
case where consideration is not present and the requirements of the doctrine are satisfied. E.g., a bilateral agreement in which one promise is
illusory.
5. Actually the doctrine that action in reliance on a promise may make
it enforceable even without consideration is not an extremely modern
theory. It has long been applied to representations of an intended abandonment of a legal right, although it was termed an exception to the general
requirement of equitable estoppel that a representation must be of an
existing fact. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544 (1877) (good
discussion of this exception although no estoppel found in this case). But
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The doctrine does not, as may be supposed upon first glance, completely abandon the requirement of consideration, thereby making
any and all promises binding upon their maker. It is surrounded by
four requirements, which confine its application to a reasonably narrow fact situation:
1. The promisor must actually forsee the action in reliance on
his promise, or it must be so inevitable that any reasonable
man in the position of the promisor would have foreseen it.
2. The action in reliance must be definite and substantial.
3. The action must be actually induced by the promise.
4. Injustice cannot be avoided by any method other than en6
forcement of the promise.
Thus all that is eliminated is the rigorous requirement of bargain
and exchange.
As might be expected, promissory estoppel was not immediately
accepted. It gained its foothold in cases of charitable subscriptions.
The courts, motivated by a consciousness of the desirability of making
gratuitous pledges binding upon the donor, seized upon the doctrine
and said that if the donee has changed its position in reliance upon
the gift, then the subscription becomes irrevocable. In 1933 Judge
Learned Hand went so far as to say that the doctrine was limited to
similar situations where the promisor expected no consideration,
refusing to apply it to commercial transactions in James Baird Co. v.
Gimbel Bros.7 One state seems to so limit the doctrine today,8 while
two others which apply it to charitable subscriptions apparently have
not had occasion to decide its applicability to commercial transactions. 9 However, the great majority of states which recognize
it is not accurate to say that the term "promissory estoppel" is the only
new thing about the doctrine because the modern cases carry its application
beyond promises of abandonment of existing rights. But see 1 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 195 (1950).
6. It is possible to reach the same result without abandoning the orthodox
view of consideration. This can be accomplished by construing the promise
an an offer for a unilateral contract. If such an interpretation is reasonable,
there is no need to resort to promissory estoppel, but in many cases this
theory is used solely to avoid injustice, and is theoretically absurd. See
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S.W.
400 (1909). As an extreme example, suppose A tells B that if B will come
to A's house, A will give him a drink. It could hardly be argued that B's
coming to A's house was an act bargained for in return for A's promise. It is
merely a condition of the gift. (I do not imply that such a promise would
be binding on the theory of promissory estoppel.)
7. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
8. Danby v. Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 104 A.2d 903 (Del. 1954) enforces
an executory gift to charity on the basis of estoppel, but indicates that
the doctrine is limited to this type of case, since it arose out of a desire by
the courts to protect charities.
9. Lake Bluff Orphanage v. Magill's Ex'rs, 305 Ky. 391, 204 S.W.2d 224
(1947); Floyd v. Christian Church Widows & Orphans Home, 296 Ky. 196, 176
S.W.2d 125 (1943); Strahm v. Board of Trustees of the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 203 Okl. 635, 225 P.2d 159 (1950).
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promissory estoppel do not so limit its scope, and by 1945 even Judge
Hand was persuaded to abandon his restrictive interpretation.10 Thirtysix states apply the principle of promissory estoppel today. Of these,
twenty-four expressly recognize section 90 of the Restatement of
Contracts," four use the term promissory estoppel without reference
to the Restatement i 2 and eight accomplish the same result on the
theory of estoppel without mention of either section 90 or the term
"promissory estoppel."'13 Two states seem to reject the doctrine.14

II. MEASURE

OF DAMAGES

Although there are innumerable cases which discuss and apply
the theory of promissory estoppel, there are very few which discuss
the question of what relief should be given once the doctrine is applied to a promise. This scarcity of authority is caused by the fact
that in a great many of the cases in which promises are enforced
10. United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806 (1949); Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 361, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby,
144 A.2d 123, 885 (Del. 1958); McGowen v. McCord, 49 Ga. App. 358, 175 S.E.
593 (1934) (semble); Montonaga v. Ishirmaru, 38 Haw. 158 (1948); Lake
Bluff Orphanage v. Magill's Ex'rs, 305 Ky. 391, 204 S.W.2d 224 (1947);
International Shoe Co. v. Lacy, 114 Ind. App. 641, 53 N.E.2d 636 (1944) (offer
too indefinite for reasonable reliance however); Iiller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa
1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954); Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 Pac. 759
(1930); Anderson v. Truitt, 158 Md. 193, 148 Atl. 223 (1930); Martin v. Dixie
Planing Mill, 199 Miss. 455, 24 So.2d 332 (1946); Fiers v. Jacobson, 123
Mont. 242, 211 P.2d 968 (1949) (limiting the application of § 90 to promises
relating to the abandonment of existing rights); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322
S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959); Kucera v. Kavan, 165 Neb. 131, 84 N.W.2d 207 (1957)
(alternative holding, but a recent affirmance of Fluckey v. Anderson, 132
Neb. 664, 273 N.W. 41 (1937)); Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 39 N.J.
Super. 103, 120 A.2d 633 (1956); Clement v. Clement, 230 N.C. 636, 55 S.E.2d
459 (1949) (dictum); Richter v. First Nat'1 Bank, 82 Ohio App. 421, 80
N.E.2d 243 (1947); Shafer v. Fraser, 206 Ore. 446, 290 P.2d 190 (1955).
Berliner v. Bee Em Mfg. Co., 383 Pa. 458, 119 A.2d 65 (1956); Northwestern
Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943); Mann v.
McDermott, 77 R.I. 142, 73 A.2d 815 (1950); Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386,
295 P.2d 332 (1956) (application refused because of lack of injustice);
Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash.2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955) (no
application because promise conditional); Hanna State & Say. Bank v.
Matson, 53 Wyo. 1, 77 P.2d 621 (1938) (unusual in that the promise was
implied from conduct).
12. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Linebarger Constr. Co., 219 Ark. 11, 240 S.W.2d
12 (1951); South Inv. Corp. v. Norton, 57 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1952) (dictum indicating restriction to promises relating to abandonment of existing rights);
Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 162 Misc. 491, 293 N.Y.S. 745 (1937)
(dicta); Strahm v. Board of Trustees of the Benevolent & Protective Order
of Elks, 203 Okl. 635, 225 P.2d 159 (1950).
13. Chamberlain v. Poe, 127 Colo. 215, 256 P.2d 229 (1953); Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 A.2d 146 (1938); Berman v. Greggs,
145 Me. 258, 75 A.2d 365 (1950); Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397
(1901); Faxton v. Faxton, 28 Mich. 159 (1873); Axel Newman Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Savers, 234 Minn. 140, 47 N.W.2d 769 (1951); Marsh v. State
Bank & Trust Co., 153 Tern. 400, 284 S.W. 380 (1925); Rancher v. Franks,
269 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
14. Ozier v. Haines, 343 Ill. App. 400, 99 N.E.2d 395 (1951); Ducote v. Oden,
221 La. 228, 59 So.2d 130 (1952).
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because of substantial reliance thereon the defendant is the party
benefited by the application of the doctrine, while in others the
damages would be the same regardless of the measure used.15
The problem is in essence this: If Uncle promises Johnny $1000 to
buy a car, and Johnny is able to buy the car for $500, is Uncle liable
to Johnny for $1000 or $500?16
Those writers who have discussed the problem differ as to the
proper measure of damages. Professor Williston says the amount of
damages .should be determined as in any other contract-he would
give Johnny $1000.17 Professor Corbin, on the other hand, advocates

no such definite rule, but rather makes the choice of remedy dependent upon the circumstances of each case, with the maximum
recovery being the value of the performance promised by the defendant.'8 Professor Fuller agrees with the latter view, advocating
remedies on the theory of contract or restitution or indemnification
of the promisee for any loss incurred in reliance on the promise,
depending upon the facts of each case. 19 The Restatement does not
expressly solve the problem since it does not specify in what manner
15. As a simplified example, suppose A promises B to give B $1000 if he
will go to Europe for the summer. This is clearly a promise to make a gift,
the trip to Europe being a condition to the gift and not an act bargained for
in return for A's promise. Now suppose B takes the trip and spends $1000
or more in so doing. A refuses to pay, and B sues for $1000. Assuming
promissory estoppel enforces the promise, damages will be $1000 regardless
of whether the court applies the contract theory, or merely reimburses B
for his loss in reliance on the promise.
16. 4 ALI PROCEEDINGS (Appendix) 98-99 (1926).
17. When the precise question was put to Professor Williston, he replied:
"If Johnny had done what he was expected to do, or is acting within the
limits of his uncle's expectation, I think the uncle would be liable for $1,000;
but not otherwise." Ibid.
And later, in answer to a repetition of the same question, he said:
"Either the promise is binding or it is not ....

I could leave this whole

thing to the subject of quasi contracts so that the promisee under those
circumstances shall never recover on the promise but he shall recover such
an amount as will fairly compensate him for any injury incurred; but
it seems to me you have to take one leg or the other. You have either
to say the promise is binding or you have to go on the theory of restoring the status quo." Id. at 103-04.
18. "So then, the modern court can decree specific performance, if that
seems the best remedy, making its decree conditional on some performance by the plaintiff or on the various allowances and reductions that
equity may require. It can require the defendant to make restitution
of the specific thing received by him, or restitution of the money value
of what he has received. It can measure this money value by determining
the net addition to his economic resources-his 'unjust enrichment,' or
by determining the market equivalent of the labor and materials received by him-'quantum meruit.' Instead of restitution in any of its
forms the court can give judgment for damages measured by the value
of the promised performance-the usual remedy for breach of contract,
or measured by the actual outlay incurred by the plaintiff in past performance without including any expected profit that full performance
of the defendant's promise would have brought him." 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 205 (1950).
19. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 373, 401-06 (1936).
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a promise is "binding.
It is submitted that the measure of damages in promissory estoppel
should be the same as in a contract supported by consideration. 21 In
other words, the damages should be such as to place the promisee,
so far as possible, in as good a position as that which he would have
occupied had the promisor performed.2 2 In short, his recovery would
include loss of anticipated profits rather than being limited solely
to his expenses incurred in reliance on the promise. There are at
least three reasons why this theory seems correct.
First.-The case law, although perhaps too sparse adequately to
reflect a trend, supports the proposition. Only two cases have been
found in which a court has expressly refused to compensate the
promisee for loss of anticipated profits which he would have obtained
had the promise been fulfilled. In Terre Haute Brewing Co. v.
Dugan,23 defendant counterclaimed for breach of a promise of exclusive agency for the sale of plaintiff's beer. The court held that
there was no contract because of lack of mutuality, the defendant not
being obligated to sell any beer at all, and refused recovery of anticipated profits. It did remand the case for a determination of defendant's out-of-pocket loss in reliance on the promise. In a similar
case, Goodman v. Dicker,24 defendant represented to plaintiff that a
franchise to sell radios would be granted and that thirty to forty
radios would be delivered. The lower court held that no contract
had been proven, but that defendant was estopped to deny it because of plaintiff's reliance, and awarded damages covering cash
outlays in setting up the business and anticipated profit on the sale
of thirty radios. This was reversed as to the recovery for anticipated
profits, the court saying that "the true measure of damage is the loss
sustained by expenditures made in reliance upon the assurance ... "25
Two things are significant in these cases. Neither speaks of promissory
estoppel or section 90 of the Restatement and both deny the existence
of a contract. They are both applying what they think is equitable
estoppel, and consequently are proceeding upon the theory that even.
though there was no contract, "he who by his language or conduct
leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not
subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. '26 Hence it is only natural that they deny
a recovery of anticipated profits. In addition, the alleged contract
20. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).

21. For the general rules as to the remedies provided for breach of contract, see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 326-384.
22. RESTATEPMENT, CONTRACTS § 329, comment a (1932).
23. 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939).
24. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
25. Id. at 685.
26. Ibid.
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in each case was terminable at will, so that even if the courts had
found a contract an award of anticipated profits would have been
speculative and difficult, if not improper.27
Perhaps the leading case in support of the contract measure of
damages is Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby. 2 Plaintiff relied on representations of defendant that he would be awarded an automobile dealership if certain conditions were met. Upon defendant's refusal to
award him the franchise, plaintiff brought suit on the theory of
promissory estoppel. The court gave him a judgment for his losses
in reliance on the representations, and also for anticipated profits
from the sale of automobiles for a period of ninety days.2 9 The court
cited section 90 of the Restatement and employed the term promissory
estoppel. In discussing Goodman v. Dicker, and its elimination of
expected profits from a recovery of damages, the court said: "This
seems to us to be an unjustifiable restriction as applied to the facts
before us. Loss of three months' profit is a direct result of the
breach." 30 It is evident that here the theory was that action in
reliance created a contract, and damages should be awarded for any
loss directly resulting "from the breach," not limited to loss resulting
from the reliance.
While there are no other cases which actually discuss the issue,
several can be pointed out in which recovery was allowed on the
theory of contract when it would have been possible to restore the
status quo if the court had desired to do so. For instance, in Richter
v. First Natl Bank,31 plaintiff, alleging an exclusive agency to sell
real estate, sued for the commission he would have received if defendant had not made the sale itself. The defense was no consideration. The court held that plaintiff's efforts to make the sale were
sufficient to enforce the promise on the basis of promissory estoppel
and gave judgment for the amount of the commission. Had a restitutionary theory been preferred, it would seem that plaintiff would
have been limited to a recovery of the reasonable value of his services.
Klein v. Farmer32 is similar, the court refusing recovery of a gift of
stock by the donee's executor from the donee. The gift had been
conditional upon defendant's care of the donee until his death. The
court allowed defendant to keep the stock, although it could have
forced a return of the stock conditioned upon payment to defendant
27. This statement may perhaps be inaccurate as applied to the Goodman
case. It may be argued that there the alleged contract was terminable at will
after the delivery of thirty radios.
28. 144 A.2d 123, 885 (Del. 1958).
29. The standard dealership contract was terminable upon ninety days'

notice.

30. 144 A.2d 123, 135 (Del. 1958).
31. 82 Ohio App. 421, 80 N.E.2d 243 (1947).
32. 85 Cal. App. 2d 545, 194 P.2d 106 (1948).
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of the reasonable value of her services in excess of her salary.
Cases in which a subcontractor's bid has been held irrevocable
33
present another example of the adoption of the contract measure.
34
Both Northwestern Engineering Co. v. ElZerman and Drennan v.
Star Paving Co. 35 held that the proper measure of damages in this
situation is the difference between the subcontractor's bid and the
cost to the plaintiff of securing the performance elsewhere-the
normal remedy for breach of contract. Yet the contractor could have
been made whole by a judgment for the difference between the next
highest bid and the cost of securing performance after defendant
36
defaulted.
It can be seen from the foregoing examples that the tendency
of the courts, once a promise is held to be enforceable on the
reliance theory, is to apply a contractual remedy to the situation.
Only in those cases which fail to recognize the theory is the recovery
limited to losses incurred in reliance on the promise.
Second.-The result of these cases is theoretically correct in view
of the nature of promissory estoppel as defined by the courts. In discussing promissory estoppel the courts often describe the reliance as
consideration,37 a "species of consideration," 38 a "substitute for consideration,"'39 or "technical if not conventional consideration. '40 If this
analysis is carried to its logical conclusion the normal contract remedy
is inevitable. For if the courts are saying that this reliance is consideration, or a type of consideration, then they are also saying that a
33. In the usual situation, there is no consideration given in exchange for

the subcontractor's bid because the contractor gives no promise in return.
Incorporation of the bid into the contractor's bid is not consideration because
not bargained for. However, his reliance on the bid is said to support the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. Hickerson v. The Logan-Long Co., Civil
No. 4427, S.D. Ohio, 1960. See cases infra note 34, 35.
34. 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d.879 (1943); 71 S.D. 236, 23 N.W.2d 273 (1946).
35. 51 Cal.2d 361, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
36. Suppose Contractor receives bids from subcontractors A and B for
$1000 and $2000 respectively. He incorporates A's bid of $1000 into his own
and is awarded the contract. A refuses to perform, and Contractor, after
receiving bids again, is forced to pay $3000 for the work. He sues A on the
theory of promissory estoppel. It seems clear that Contractor can be restored
to the position he would have been in had he not relied on A's bid by an
award of the difference between B's bid and the cost of performance-$1000.
He would have taken B's bid if he had not relied on A's, and consequently
would have paid $2000. So the cost of his reliance was $1000. Yet the

courts give judgment for $2000, which clearly gives Contractor the benefit of

his bargain.

37. French v. French, 161 Kan. 327, 167 P.2d 305 (1946).

38. Porter v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1932); Miller v. Lawlor,
245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163
(Mo. 1959); Clement v. Clement, 230 N.C. 636, 55 S.E.2d 459 (1949).
39. United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1945);
Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497 (1953); Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173
(1927).
40. Fluckey v. Anderson, 132 Neb. 664, 273 N.W. 41 (1937).

